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Abstract 
This paper considers the application of ‘cultural quotas’ to radio broadcasting: a 
requirement that a minimum percentage of broadcast content be of local origin.  Using 
a Hotelling location model derived in Richardson (2004) we show that, while the 
laissez-faire solution involves less than (socially optimal) maximal differentiation, a 
quota reduces the differentiation between the stations even further.  While a cultural 
quota may raise consumer welfare, the reduced station diversity and advertising levels 
monotonically lower overall social welfare.  We consider two other policies – a limit 
on advertising and a publicly provided non-commercial station – and show that both 
also reduce diversity, compared to the laissez-faire solution.  An advertising cap is not 
as effective as the quota in achieving greater airplay for local content for least welfare 
cost but a public station can be, depending on the magnitude of its associated fixed 
costs.   
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JEL classification numbers: L59, L82, Z10. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Many countries have imposed local content requirements on their domestic 
broadcasters.  In a companion paper (Richardson (2004)) we have modelled the 
choice of programming mix between local and international content as one of 
horizontal differentiation à la Hotelling.  Consumers’ preferences for the two types of 
content vary and commercial radio stations choose their broadcast mix in an effort to 
maximise advertising revenue.  A cultural quota is then modelled as a locational 
constraint on radio stations.  In this setting Richardson (2004) shows that less than 
maximal differentiation obtains between unconstrained stations and we demonstrate 
here that a quota further reduces that differentiation.  While a cultural quota may raise 
consumer welfare and the profits of the constrained radio station, it monotonically 
lowers overall welfare – absent any positive externality attached to the broadcasting 
of local content – by decreasing diversity and thus advertising.  We consider two other 
policies – a limit on advertising and a publicly provided non-commercial station – and 
show that neither may be as effective as a quota, even allowing for an externality, in 
achieving greater airplay for local content at least welfare cost.  Interestingly, while an 
advertising cap reduces station diversity symmetrically, a public station also reduces 
the overall diversity of content played.  
There is a substantial policy-oriented literature discussing cultural quotas and 
related issues at an informal level (see, for example, Acheson and Maule (1990) and 
Jacobsen (2000)) but we are aware of only two recent papers that construct formal 
models of cultural protection.  Francois and van Ypersele (2000) present a model in 
which cultural goods are produced in different countries under increasing returns to 
scale and in which consumers have relatively homogeneous valuations for some of 
these goods (“Hollywood” movies produced in one country) but heterogeneous 
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valuations for others (“auteur” cinema produced in both, potentially).  In such a 
model, protection of a domestic market may raise welfare in both the domestic and 
foreign countries.  Domestic production of auteur cinema is encouraged by 
restrictions on foreign exports of Hollywood movies, which can raise welfare at home 
by satisfying an otherwise unmet demand from high-valuation consumers.  While 
considering the same broad area as the present paper, Francois and van Ypersele’s 
model is very different and largely unrelated to our work.  Our analysis focuses on 
‘spatial’ differentiation between cultural goods and between the media that present it 
to consumers.  Our policy instrument is a restriction on those media rather than on the 
underlying goods themselves.   
Crampes and Hollander (1999) look at a number of regulatory schemes for 
broadcasting, including content requirements, but in a non-spatial model of 
subscriber-supported media (i.e. not free-to-air broadcasting.)   So their model does 
not deal with advertising at all.  Finally, Owen and Wildman (1992) provide a good 
survey of much of the literature on the economics of TV broadcasting but, again, 
without directly discussing the issues we address here. 
In the next section we briefly summarise the model of Richardson (2004) 
before turning to an examination of three alternative policies for a cultural regulator 
concerned with the amount of local content played: a quota, an advertising ceiling and 
a public non-commercial station playing only local content. A final section concludes.  
 
 
II. A MODEL 
As in Richardson (2004), there are two radio stations each making a ‘locational’ 
choice in terms of the mix that it plays of two kinds of content: Local and that of the 
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Rest of the world.  We denote a choice of only Local content as being at location 
0∈[0,1], à la Hotelling (1929), and a choice of only Rest of the world content as being 
at the other end of this interval at point 1.  The two stations are described by their 
location along this interval, denoted by L and R, without loss of generality, L≤R.   
Consumers are distributed uniformly along this unit interval in terms of their 
preferences for mixes of the two kinds of music and each consumer located between 
the stations can construct their own optimal mix of the two kinds of content by taking 
an appropriate convex combination of the two stations.  Every consumer gets utility of 
v from listening only to their ideal mix of music and we suppose this is always 
sufficiently high that all consumers listen to the radio: the market is covered.  A 
consumer’s disutility from a less-than-ideal mix of content types is increasing and 
quadratic in the ‘distance’ from their ideal mix to the mix they consume but 
consumers also get disutility from advertising interrupting their programming.  All up, 
a consumer at location s gets total utility of u(s,λ,L,R,aL,aR)=v-t[λL+(1-λ)R-s]2-
[λaL+(1-λ)aR] from listening to L a fraction λ of the time and R  the rest of the time, 
where aj denotes advertising at station j=L,R.  Optimising over λ, a consumer’s mix 
of radio stations depends on her location and we derive the total audience, xj, listening 
to each station j=L,R, given the locations and the amounts of advertising at each:  
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(1)
We suppose that each radio station faces a competitive demand for advertising 
time from advertisers who seek to maximise some monotonic increasing function of 
total advertising exposure: the number of consumer-minutes advertised.  This affects 
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advertisers’ sales of output, and we can then derive demands for advertising at each 
station as functions of locations and the prices charged to advertisers by the stations. 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
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(2)
Total welfare, W, is total consumer welfare, U, plus radio stations’ profits, plus total 
surplus accruing to advertisers at each station, SL and SR respectively.  Under a 
particular restriction on advertisers’ “production function” from advertising:  
( )[ ] ( ) ( )( )233 1
81
41
3
2 LRLRtRLtFvW +−−−−+−−=  (3)
 Richardson (2004) establishes the following results:    
Proposition One: Absent any externality attached to local music, first best locations 
involve maximal differentiation: L=0 and R=1, whether or not advertising levels can 
also be chosen: the level of advertising is irrelevant to welfare in the first best.  Half 
of all music heard in equilibrium is of local origin. 
Proposition Two: The laissez-faire non-cooperative solution involves less than 
maximal differentiation: L=0.05, R=0.95.  Compared to the outcome under maximal 
differentiation but with endogenous advertising – also the outcome if firms were to 
collude on location choices – the laissez-faire solution yields lower advertising, 
higher consumer surplus and lower profits to both radio stations and advertisers.  
Again, half of all music heard is local.   
 
 
III. A CULTURAL REGULATOR 
Now suppose we have a cultural regulator. As we wish to allow that there may be 
something to the arguments made by proponents of local content requirements that 
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hearing local music generates some ‘cultural’ external benefit, we propose simply that 
the regulator’s objective function considers not just social welfare but the amount of 
local content heard: they seek to maximise L
R MWv ρ+=  where ρ measures the 
value of this external benefit that is linear in the amount of local content heard.  This 
is a very terse means of capturing the elaborate and emotional arguments that are 
often made in defence of cultural protection but, in the context of a simple model, it 
seems the most accurate way in which to give some power to these arguments.  Thus,  
( )[ ] ( ) ( )( )233 1
81
41
3
2 LRLRtRLtFMvv L
R +−−−−+−−+= ρ  (4)
But total local content heard is:  
( ) ( )RxLxM RLL −+−= 11  
(5)
so, from (1),  
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Before considering a number of policy instruments that might be available to a 
cultural regulator we consider the first-best choices of locations and advertising such a 
regulator would make.  The contrast with Richardson (2004) is that here ρ>0.  
Nevertheless, the optimal choice of L is still zero: if local music heard has value in 
itself then the regulator would not wish to move station L from playing only local 
music.  Furthermore, it would choose zero advertising at that station to increase its 
audience.  The optimal location of R is now a complicated function of ρ and t with the 
property that an interior solution is decreasing in ρ: the more valuable is local music 
the more the planner would choose the second station to play, trading that off against 
the desirability of spanning the distribution of consumers.  Welfare is everywhere 
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increasing in the level of advertising at station R (as it increases the audience of L) 
and is effectively constrained by the demand curve from advertisers.  Thus: 
Proposition Three:  If there is an externality attached to local music, first best 
locations still involve the left-hand station playing only local content (L=0) but the 
right-hand station also plays some local content (R≤1), the amount increasing (R 
decreasing) in the value of the externality.  Advertising at the local music station is 
zero with advertising at the other station maximised. 
We now turn to a number of policy instruments that are available to a cultural 
regulator: a quota, a cap on advertising and the provision of a public radio station.   
 
III.1. A cultural quota  
Consider now the imposition of a local content requirement – a cultural quota – on 
both radio stations requiring that they play a minimum percentage – at least c% – 
local content.  In light of the laissez-faire solution, the interesting case here is where 
c∈(0.05,0.95) so that it binds R but not L (although, as we shall see, this will be the 
case for any c∈(0,0.95)).  Station R has no incentive to more than satisfy the 
constraint so it will bind exactly on the station.  As this quota is effectively a 
locational constraint it turns out to be notationally simpler to deal with γ≡1-c: the 
maximum permitted fraction of non-local content that R can play.   A greater local 
content requirement – a tighter quota – then corresponds to a lower γ.   
 Before looking at the optimal quota we first derive the comparative static 
effects of changes in the quota level.  Inspection of L’s best response function reveals 
that there are two qualitatively different quota levels here: if γ≤0.8 – which we shall 
call a restrictive quota – then L’s best response is to locate at the end of the segment 
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i.e. L=0, whereas for γ∈(0.8,0.95) – a mild quota – L will be less than completely 
specialised in local content.  
 
III.1.a. Effects on local content audience 
Consider first the case of a restrictive quota in which γ≤0.8.  Consequently R=γ and, 
L’s best response is L=0.  We can then recalculate the values of all variables of 
interest.  Our first result1 is that the profits of both stations are increasing in γ so 
tightening a restrictive content requirement (a lower γ) makes both stations worse off.2  
As the quota is tightened, the price of advertising at L decreases and that at R 
increases but, nevertheless, advertising at both stations falls: L’s market share is 
falling while R’s is rising.  What effect does the quota have on the amount of local 
content played and heard?  With this restrictive quota clearly more local content is 
being played – L is now playing only local content and R is playing more than before.  
Total local content aired is now ½(2-γ).  But we may have fewer people listening only 
to station L and we certainly have a greater fraction listening only to R.  For the rest, 
we need to integrate over the consumers listening to both stations.  Interestingly, there 
are now some consumers who prefer less local content than is provided by R (i.e. 
located to the right of R) who will still listen to some L.  The reason is that there is 
less advertising on L than on the otherwise preferred R.  Still, we can show that 
tightening the quota always leads to more local content being heard overall.  
If we consider instead the case of a mild quota (in which γ∈(0.8,0.95)) then, as 
with a restrictive quota, both the price and level of advertising at L decrease as the 
                                                          
1  The derivations of all results are in a Technical Appendix available from the author on request. 
2  As in Richardson (2004), there is a non-negative profit constraint on the regulator, which we ignore, 
implicitly assuming any losses are covered by the regulator. 
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quota is tightened, as its market share falls, while R’s price rises with its market share 
and advertising at R also increases.  While station L’s profits increase in γ, R’s profits 
are decreasing so R gains from a tighter quota while L is harmed by it.  This 
observation – that the constrained firm gains while the unconstrained one loses from 
the constraint – is a familiar one from the literature; see e.g. Ronnen (1991) or 
Crampes and Hollander (1995) on minimum quality standards. 
 What effect does a mild quota have on the amount of local content played and 
heard?  Once more, total local content heard exceeds 50% and tightening the quota 
always leads to more local content being heard. 
 Putting these two quota regimes together, we can plot the amount of local 
content played and heard as in Figure 1 (not to scale).     
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
In this Figure the dotted line shows local content played as a percentage of all airtime 
while the heavy line illustrates local content heard as a percentage of all airtime.  
What explains the shape of this Figure?  Tightening the quota always increases the 
amount of local content played, initially quite sharply as both stations play more until 
L is playing only local content (after c=80%.)  But the quota has two effects on the 
amount of local content being listened to – it changes the mix played by each station 
(an effect that always works to increase the amount of local content) but it also 
  0.2
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changes the audience each station faces.  As the quota is tightened, both stations R and 
L move down the spectrum.  While R’s market increases, the audience shifting effect 
– more people listening to the less local content intensive station – never outweighs 
the mix effect. 
We summarise these comparative statics results below. 
Comparative statics of a cultural quota: Tightening a local-music quota 
(i) monotonically reduces both R and L, the latter reaching zero at a quota of 
20%, increasing R’s market share at L’s expense; 
(ii) reduces the profits of L and initially increases then decreases the profits of R;  
(iii) reduces both the price and level of advertising at L but  increases both the 
price and level of advertising at R; 
(iv) increases the amount of local music heard, but by less than the increase in the 
amount played. 
If we consider, by way of a benchmark, a model with no advertising in which 
consumers subscribe directly to their preferred station(s), it is straightforward to show 
– and intuitive in light of the above analysis – that a content requirement acts just like 
a restrictive quota above.  The reason is that, because the laissez-faire solution in the 
subscription case is maximal differentiation, a quota on R elicits no locational 
response from L.  So, as the quota is tightened, local music heard increases, both 
firms’ profits decline and both utility and welfare decline.   
 
III.1.b. Welfare 
Again, consider first a restrictive quota.  Some consumers listen only to L and their 
disutility is aLγ+ ts2 where a gamma subscript indicates values taken under a 
restrictive quota.  For such a consumer, welfare rises as the quota is tightened because 
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the only effect on them, at the margin, is the decrease in aLγ as γ falls.  Some 
consumers listen only to R and their disutility is aRγ+ t(s-γ)2.   Such a consumer gains 
from the decreased advertising at R as γ falls but loses from their increased disutility 
as R moves down the spectrum and becomes less appealing. (Indeed, we can find a 
critical location sR(γ)=(35γ+14)/45 such that a consumer with s>sR is worse off 
overall as the quota is tightened and a consumer with s<sR is better off.)  Finally, for 
other consumers listening to both stations disutility is t(Γs-s)2+aRγ-λs(aRγ-aLγ).  (We 
can show that as the quota is tightened, consumers who listen to both stations but are 
not ‘too close’ to L will listen to less of L and more of R, even though the advertising 
at L is decreasing more rapidly as the quota is tightened than that at R.)  So, all up:  
( ) { }322 23737727
81
18145
18
2 γγγtγγρFvv Rγ −+−−+−+−=  (7)
Hence if there is no externality (ρ=0) welfare is increasing in γ for all relevant γ so the 
quota is always harmful.  Diagrammatically we can portray the effects of this quota on 
consumers’ welfare as in Figure 2.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
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Welfare is highest for a consumer at 0 who listens only to L, her ideal station, 
which also happens to have the lowest advertising.  Other consumers with s≤sL also 
consume only L because of the low advertising but they incur increasing (quadratic) 
disutility costs the less local content they prefer. Consumers between sL and sR mix 
both stations but get lower utility as their preferred mix of R rises as it advertises more 
than its rival.  Finally, consumers listening only to R are the worst off, as shown.  
Note that a consumer located exactly at R would get utility of v-aR if they consumed 
only R but can do better by listening to some lower-advertising L as well.Turning to 
the case of a mild quota and proceeding as before demonstrates that, in the absence of 
any externality, welfare is increasing in γ over the entire range of γ∈[0.8,0.95].  So 
welfare again falls as the quota is tightened.  
 Looking at welfare (with ρ=0) over the entire range of the quota yields Figure 
3 (not to scale) in which welfare losses are steeper initially until L is driven to play 
only local content when the quota hits 20%.  If we look at the various components of 
welfare, however, it is interesting to note that consumers actually gain from a small 
quota, as illustrated.  Consumers’ welfare initially rises as the local content 
requirement is increased from the no-quota level of 5% and then increases more 
rapidly as it rises beyond c=20%.  It is maximised at around c2≅62% and then falls.3   
 
 
                                                          
3 Suppose this ‘optimal’ local content requirement of around 62% were to be imposed.  Then station L 
plays only local content and gets a little under 33% of the market, station R plays around 62% local 
content and gets a little over 67% of the market and local content is a little under 74% of total 
broadcasting heard.  Consumer welfare is approximately v-0.2567t, compared to the no-intervention 
level of approximately v-0.3601t.  Now station R charges more for advertising and places fewer 
advertisements and makes lower profits than in the absence of a quota, while station L charges less but 
still places fewer advertisements and so also makes lower profits. 
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Figure 3 
What is driving this is that as the quota is tightened, the stations become less 
differentiated and total advertising heard falls as the quota is tightened.  This initially 
raises the welfare of consumers who dislike advertising until the quota is so restrictive 
that the welfare gains from reduced advertising are more than offset by the disutility 
losses of less ideal station content mixes.  
Looking at the other components of welfare, (πL+πR) and (SL+SR) are 
isomorphic and Figure 3 also illustrates their sum.  While profits and surplus are 
monotonically decreasing in the local content requirement, once it exceeds 20% and 
station L plays only local content, profits and surplus decline more steeply in c 
although at an initially decreasing rate, as shown.  Finally, plotting the value of the 
 W
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externality would simply give us a relationship (unshown) isomorphic to the heavy 
line in Figure 1 illustrating ML. 
 So far we have said little of the externality.  Its effects, however, are quite 
straightforward.  We have seen that in the absence of any external benefit associated 
with listening to local content a cultural quota is welfare-reducing.  The more 
significant the externality becomes, the more attractive is a quota.  Figure 4 presents a 
numerical simulation of the model that illustrates this point.   
 
Figure 4 
 
With no externality (ρ equals zero) welfare is declining monotonically in the content 
requirement.  When the externality is more significant (ρ=0.7t) welfare is increasing 
monotonically in the content requirement.  At intermediate values of ρ we find an 
optimal level of the content requirement that, not surprisingly, is increasing in ρ. 
We summarize the discussion of this section as follows: 
Proposition Four: Tightening a cultural quota 
(i) monotonically reduces social welfare; 
(ii) initially increases consumers’ welfare but eventually reduces it; 
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(iii) monotonically reduces stations’ and advertisers’ total surplus; 
(iv) increases a regulator’s welfare if the value, ρ, placed on local music is 
sufficiently high – the regulator’s optimal quota is then increasing in ρ. 
 
III.2 Advertising limits 
The gains in welfare from imposing a cultural quota come in this model from the 
decreased advertising such a quota induces by making the radio stations more similar 
in programming.  This suggests that a better policy would be simply to cap the 
amount of advertising stations can offer.  In this section we consider such a policy, 
which has been proposed for television regulation (see the discussion in Gabszewicz 
et al (1999)).   
Suppose the amount of advertising each station can place is limited to a.  
Suppose, initially, that this ceiling is ‘very low’ in a sense made clear below.  Then it 
will constrain both stations4 and each will simply choose its price such that demand 
from advertisers is exactly a.  Inverting (2) and solving the reaction functions:  
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In the first stage of the game, then, radio station j=L,R chooses its location to 
maximise πj=pja.  From (8) and assuming a symmetric solution we can solve for 
equilibrium locations and hence prices and profits as functions of the limit, a:  
                                                          
4  We focus only on symmetric equilibria.  But see Gabszewicz et al (1999) for a detailed derivation in 
their model of the constraint binding both stations as an equilibrium property.  
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As noted earlier, the equilibrium we describe above applies only when the advertising 
limit is severe.  To see this we can note that, in the absence of any constraint, any 
symmetric solution has aL=aR≡a=2(1-2L)t/5 compared to a=4t(½-L)2 here, from (9).  
So, given locations, the constraint only binds if a≤a which can be rewritten as 
L∈[0.3,0.5] which, in turn, requires a∈[0,0.16t] from (9).  Thus our analysis above 
only holds if the advertising ceiling is less than 4t/25.  If, instead, a∈[0.16t,0.36t] 
where the upper limit is the laissez-faire level of advertising, Appendix A shows that 
the equilibrium locations will then be those that yield a as an optimal choice in the 
absence of any advertising limit.   
Turning to welfare, we again have LRLRL
R MSSUv ρππ +++++= .  We 
can show that welfare is everywhere decreasing as advertising is restricted over the 
range a∈[0,0.36t].  Consumer welfare alone, however, is maximised at a≅0.01 at 
which point (subject to our earlier caveat concerning zero-profit constraints) we get 
U≅v-0.707t which compares favourably to the laissez-faire level of consumer welfare, 
(v-0.3601t).   
So while an advertising ceiling is always welfare-reducing, it does benefit 
consumers.  As in Gabszewicz et al (1999), it leads to both stations locating 
progressively much nearer to the centre of the spectrum and thus leads to much lower 
differentiation between them – not surprisingly, as the only rationale for 
differentiation here is to foster advertising – and exactly half of all music heard being 
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local.  But while consumers find that the disutility costs associated with an 
undesirable product mix are increased, this is more than offset by gains from reduced 
advertising.  Nevertheless, an advertising cap is less successful in achieving the goals 
of a cultural quota than the quota itself as it reduces welfare by more as well as having 
no effect on the amount of local music heard.  
An interesting implication of this is that the optimal advertising policy is to 
impose an advertising floor of a=0.4t which gives maximal differentiation – L=0 and 
R=1 – and consumer utility of v-a.  So, while consumer welfare is lower, total welfare 
is higher at v+(ρ/2).    
  We summarize the discussion of this section in Proposition Five. 
Proposition Five: An advertising ceiling, compared to the laissez-faire solution, 
(i) decreases diversity by leading L and R  to locate closer together; 
(ii) monotonically reduces the joint surplus of advertisers and radio stations;  
(iii) initially increases consumer welfare before decreasing it; 
(iv) monotonically reduces social welfare; 
(v) has no impact on the amount of local music heard.. 
 
III.3. A public station 
Suppose the government were to provide a publicly-funded radio station – denote it P 
– that broadcasts no advertising and plays only local content and so is located at 0 on 
our spectrum.5  A consequence of such a policy is that L will move up the spectrum 
and we shall look for an equilibrium in which P<L<R.  There are a number of 
possible listening patterns that might arise for consumers.  Some might listen to only 
                                                          
5  Note that we avoid the usual non-existence problem with three firms in the Hotelling model (see 
Economides (1993)) because of non-linear transport costs and because our public station’s location – 
and price – is fixed by assumption. 
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P, only L or only R, others might listen to both P and L or to both L and R, as before, 
but it is also possible that some might listen to both P and R: the lack of advertising at 
P makes it attractive.   
But any equilibrium must involve aL<aR.  If not then no consumers would 
listen to L at all: a consumer between R and P can create their own ideal content mix 
by combining those two stations with lower advertising than if they listened to any L.  
Indeed, for any locations 0=P<L<R it must be the case that aL is such that no 
consumer mixes P and R.  The reason is that if any consumer finds it optimal to 
combine P and R then all consumers between P and R must do so too, thus leaving no 
market for L.  This is most easily seen in Figure 5.  Suppose locations and advertising 
are such that consumers’ surplus from station P, L and R, as a function of location s, is 
as shown by UP(s), UL(s) and UR(s) respectively. As shown, any consumer in the 
interval P+R does better by combining P and R rather than consuming any L at all. 
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So there are only two possible configurations of advertising and audience mixes here, 
given locations.  One is that aL is sufficiently low that we have a situation where 
consumers listen to only P, only L, only R, both P and L or to both L and R.  It can be 
shown that such an outcome cannot be an equilibrium; instead, station L will increase 
its advertising to the point at which consumers are just indifferent between consuming 
P and L and consuming L and R.  Thus aLR=aRL.  This reduces its total market share 
but increases its advertising and is illustrated in Figure 6.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 
Proceeding as before, we first need to identify the critical locations at the boundaries 
of each market segment.  We can then derive the market shares of the stations as 
before but with a third station, P. From these expressions we can calculate total 
advertising exposure at the two commercial stations, aixi for i=L,R, and maximise 
advertisers’ surplus over the choice of ai given prices and locations.  We can then 
solve for the equilibrium prices and advertising levels at the two commercial stations, 
                                                          
6   See Appendix B, which discusses a potential non-existence problem here. 
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which in turn yield profits as functions of locations.  Differentiating each of these and 
manipulating yields two messy expressions that solve for L and R:  
8634.0
522
48963183934.0
87
104892 ≅+=≅−= RL  (10)
From this we can calculate all the variables of interest:  
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(11)
The first thing to note here is that while the existence of the public station drives 
station L to play less local content, it leads station R to play more – it shifts down the 
spectrum from 0.95 to around 0.86.  So, rather surprisingly, instead of driving both 
commercial stations up the spectrum, the provision of P rather induces less diversity.  
This occurs because of the reaction of L to the new entrant: L is displaced by a non-
commercial station and this must lead to a drastic reduction in its advertising if it is to 
attract listeners. This puts pressure on R’s market share so R then moves closer to 
increase its market share and appeal to advertisers.  While both stations have 
substantially lower profits than in the absence of P, if R were to move further up the 
spectrum it would be followed by L.  How much local content is played and heard?  
Local content played is a little over 58.1% of total airtime and local content heard is a 
little under 58.3% of total broadcasting listened to.   
 Turning to welfare, we find that a non-commercial public radio station playing 
only local content yields surplus to the regulator of vPR:  
0.5830 0.0071 3
R
p P L R L R Lv U S S M
v t F
π π π ρ
ρ
= + + + + + +
≅ + − −  (12)
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 How effective is a publicly-provided station?  If the regulator’s objective is to 
increase the amount of local content heard, we have seen that this policy raises it from 
50% to around 58%.  If we chose the local content requirement that yielded the same 
amount of local content it can be shown that we would need a requirement of around 
28% which would yield welfare of v+0.5830ρ-0.0098t-2F.  This may be greater than 
that associated with the public station depending on the costs of establishing the latter: 
if greater than 0.0027t then a publicly provided station is not an attractive option.   
Fixed costs aside, however, the public station is preferred to the local content-
equivalent quota (but not necessarily to the regulator’s optimal quota) for a couple of 
reasons.  As total advertising washes out of the welfare calculus, the only sources of 
welfare differences can be disutility costs from less than ideal mixes for consumers.  
But market ‘coverage’ is greater with the public station (where P=0 and R is around 
0.86) than under the local content-equivalent quota (in which L=0 and R is around 
0.72).   Furthermore, the differences in advertising levels across the stations distort the 
listening choices of inframarginal consumers away from their ideals less dramatically 
with the public station than the equivalent quota: with the public station, the 
difference in advertising levels between the commercial stations is only 0.0801t 
whereas under the equivalent quota it is 0.0896t.   
We summarize this discussion in Proposition Six.7 
Proposition Six: A publicly-provided non-commercial radio station (no advertising) 
playing only local music, compared to the laissez-faire solution, 
                                                          
7  We have also looked at the impact of a public firm competing with a single commercial broadcaster à 
la ‘mixed oligopoly’ models.  In such a case we assume the public firm, with no advertising, chooses 
its location to maximise welfare.  Its equilibrium location turns out to be at around L=0.112 which 
induces the commercial station to locate at around R=0.704.  Advertising at R is around 0.175 at a price 
of 0.296, local music heard is around 62.5% of total listening time and welfare, for ρ=0, becomes W≅v-
2F-0.0101t.  This compares favourably to welfare under the local content-equivalent quota (of γ≅0.173) 
of W≅v-2F-0.1943t.  I am grateful to a referee for suggesting this exercise.   
Cultural Quotas   
 
Page 22 
(i) induces L to play less local music but R to play more;  
(ii) reduces profits at both commercial stations; 
(iii) increases local music heard above the level played;  
(iv) increases consumers’ welfare; 
(v) can increase the regulator’s welfare and by more than the local music-
equivalent quota if the fixed cost of establishing the public station is 
sufficiently low.   
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In the context of a model developed in Richardson (2004), this paper has considered 
three policy options for a regulator that wishes to increase the exposure of local 
content in broadcasting.  A local content requirement – a cultural quota – will increase 
the amount of local content heard and can even lead to greater utility for consumers.  
However, it harms advertisers and the radio stations8 by reducing the differentiation 
between the latter and overall is welfare reducing in the absence of any externality 
associated with an increased local content audience.  Comparing this policy to both a 
cap on advertising and a publicly-funded non-commercial station that plays only local 
content, the quota can be welfare-dominant, with or without an externality.   
 An advertising cap also decreases diversity by leading the stations to locate 
closer together in the centre of the spectrum.  While consumers gain from the lower 
advertising, more are harmed by the decreased diversity of the stations available.  The 
problem with the publicly provided station is that it competes most directly with the 
more local content oriented station, L.  So the latter must cut its advertising drastically 
                                                          
8   Eventually – a mild quota, we have seen, benefits the constrained station, R. 
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which induces the other commercial station to move in closer rather than to move 
further away.9  So, again, diversity is reduced.  An interesting consequence of this is 
that the optimal policy is to impose an advertising floor – a requirement that stations 
advertise more. This arises because the laissez-faire solution has too little diversity, 
which is as critics often suggest.  However, it occurs because stations compete for 
advertising and are driven closer by this competition.  If required to sell more 
advertising each would move away from the other as close locations imply fierce 
price competition in order to satisfy the advertising requirement.  Aware of this, the 
stations become more diverse and, in so doing, decrease consumer disutility from 
less-than-ideal locations (although consumers are worse off overall as the losses from 
greater advertising more than offset the gains from greater diversity.)   
 At a sufficient level of abstraction, our results seem fairly general.  In 
particular, we highlight the fact that a cultural quota decreases the diversity of radio 
stations and stress the ramifications of this for advertising.  As our comparative statics 
follow from the model’s Hotelling roots they seem quite robust, in contrast to our 
welfare conclusions, which rely on a restriction on the advertising side of the model 
resulting in the gains from advertising to advertisers exactly offsetting the losses to 
consumers.  If, instead, it were assumed that advertising has a net positive (negative) 
effect then one might expect a quota to be less (more) attractive than in our model 
because, in reducing diversity, it also decreases the amount of advertising heard.   
 In terms of future work that might be pursued here, we have assumed in our 
analysis that the market is always covered – all consumers listen to radio stations.   If 
                                                          
9   Note that when advertising is endogenous, closer locations lead to greater aggression in the form of 
lower advertising, which is why laissez faire locations are well apart as the firms, in anticipation of that 
competition, locate away from each other.  When advertising is limited exogenously, as here, a firm is 
drawn closer to its rival: the incentive to move in is the higher market share and the incentive to move 
out – to lessen advertising competition – has been stifled by the regulation. 
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we allow that consumers will not listen if the combined disutility of the content mix 
and advertising level is ‘too high’ then an extra welfare-reducing effect of a cultural 
quota will arise: some consumers with a strong preference for international content 
will drop out of the market in the face of the quota.  Further, our model has the 
testable empirical implications that a local content scheme will increase the local 
content of all radio stations, whether the scheme is directly binding on them or not 
and that it will reduce advertising, ceteris paribus.   
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Appendix A 
We claim in the paper that the equilibrium locations under a ‘slight’ advertising 
constraint will be those locations that yield a as an optimal choice in the absence of 
any advertising limit.  From the expressions for equilibrium advertising in (16), and 
assuming a symmetric solution, we can solve for: 
'
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
 −=  and '
2
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 +=  
Now, suppose these locations are chosen.  Would either station then wish to move, 
given the advertising limit?  Note first that  
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So L could be increased without violating the constraint, but not decreased.  Anyway, 
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Evaluating this at the locations calculated above for L and R, yields:  
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where the negative sign follows from the fact that a≤0.36t.  So, ignoring the 
constraint, L would like to move down the spectrum, away from R at these locations.  
Doing so, however, will run into the advertising constraint.  If L is reduced, given R, 
then pL must be increased so that aL=a still.  From (22) we have the price that must be 
set and solving L’s  problem then gives,  
( ) ( ){ }aLRtLRt adLd L −−−= 222π  
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where the sign follows because a≥0.16t.  So, given the constraint, L does not wish to 
move down the spectrum either.  Thus L=L′ is a best response to R=R′ and a similar 
exercise shows the same for R′.   
 
Appendix B 
Returning to the issue regarding the possibility, with a public station, that xL=0, we 
note that there is a possible nonexistence problem here.10  Looking at Figure 6, we 
have aL(pL,xL)R=aR(pR,xR)L.  Let xR′=xR+xL.  Now suppose that, given R and L, 
station R instead sets pR′>>pR to yield aR′(pR′,xR′)=aR-ε<aR such that no consumers 
listen to L at all (see Figure 5.)  Then R’s market share will be approximately xR′ and 
because aR′=aR(pR′,xR′)≅aR(pR,xR) its profits would seem to be discretely higher than 
with price pR, suggesting that the latter cannot be part of a Nash equilibrium.  
Edgeworth paradox-like, this reasoning would suggest no pure equilibrium exists in 
prices for any locations as R’s profit function is discontinuous in its price.  However, 
this argument ignores the fact that demand for advertising at L also depends on pR.  If 
firm R were to choose its price to ‘undercut’ L’s advertising levels, the fall in L’s 
market share would also decrease demand for advertising at L, given pL.  Thus a small 
rise in pR does not lead to a discrete increase in πR but rather changes πR by trading off 
a higher price against lower advertising, a trade-off that has approximately zero effect 
on profits when pR is chosen optimally. 
                                                          
10   This is rather different to the non-existence problems (for pure strategies) that can plague standard 
Hotelling-type models.   See Osborne and Pitchik (1987) for a discussion. 
  Cultural Quotas 
Page 27 
References 
Acheson, K. and C. Maule, 1990, Canadian content rules: a time for reconsideration.  
Canadian Public Policy 16#3, 284-297. 
 
Crampes, C., and A. Hollander, 1995, Duopoly and quality standards. European 
Economic Review 39#1, 71-82. 
 
Crampes, C., and A. Hollander, 1999, The regulation of audiovisual content: quotas 
and conflicting objectives. Mimeo, Centre de Recherche sur les Transports, 
University of Montreal.  
 
Economides, N., 1993, Hotelling’s “Main Street” with more than two competitors.  
Journal of Regional Science 33#3, 303-319. 
 
Francois, P. and T. van Ypersele, 2000, On the protection of cultural goods.  Mimeo, 
Tilburg University, July 2000. 
 
Gabszewicz, J., D. Laussel and N. Sonnac, 1999, TV-Broadcasting competition and 
advertising.  Mimeo, C.O.R.E., October 1999. 
 
Gal-Or, E., and A. Dukes, 2002, Minimum differentiation in commercial media 
markets.  Mimeo, University of Pittsburgh. 
 
Hotelling, H., 1929, Stability in competition.  Economic Journal 39#153, 41-57. 
 
Jacobsen, V., 2000, Local content regulation of New Zealand television.  Arthur 
Andersen: Wellington, NZ. 
 
Osborne, M. and C. Pitchik, 1987, Equilibrium in Hotelling’s model of spatial 
competition. Econometrica 55#4, 911-922. 
 
Owen, B. and S. Wildman, 1992, Video Economics.  Harvard University Press: 
Cambridge, MA.   
 
Richardson, M., 2004, Cultural quotas in broadcasting I: a model.  Working Paper in 
Economics and Econometrics Number 442, Faculty of Economics and 
Commerce, Australian National University: Canberra: Australia.   
 
Ronnen, U., 1991, Minimum quality standards, fixed costs and competition. RAND 
Journal 22#4, 490-504.   
